Deep-dives into AI agent security, engineering, and the future of autonomous systems.
Primary Intelligence
If you’re trying to connect your Gmail account to Claude, the setup you choose matters. Learn how to do it right with Stow.
Report ID: 01
Giving Claude access to Slack is powerful — but without the right controls, that means access to every channel, every message, every user. Here's how to do it right.
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Connecting Claude to Google Drive unlocks powerful document automation. But "access to Drive" can mean access to every file you've ever saved. Here's how to do it right.
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AI plus spreadsheets is one typo away from corrupting your source-of-truth data. Here's how to let Claude read, update, and append your Sheets — without letting it clear or delete what it shouldn't.
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Notion is your team's second brain. Claude can search it, add to it, and structure it — but you need to decide exactly what it's allowed to change before the first request goes through.
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Letting Claude read your repos and draft pull requests is genuinely useful. Letting it merge those PRs, trigger workflows, or delete repositories without review is not. Here's the right setup.
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Cursor is already one of the most capable AI coding environments. Connect it to Stow and every tool your agent touches is logged, permissioned, and under your control.
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ChatGPT now supports external tool integrations via OAuth. Here's how to connect it to Stow so GPT-4 has access to your real tools — with a full policy and audit layer in between.
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Telling Claude to "deploy the latest build" and having it just work is powerful. The same integration rotating your production environment variables is not. Here's the right setup.
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Airtable sits at the center of a lot of operational workflows — CRMs, content calendars, intake forms. Here's how to let Claude work with your bases without giving it free rein over your records.
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AI that can check your availability and share booking links on your behalf is a real time-saver. AI that can delete your scheduling links is a real problem. Here's how to set the right boundaries.
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Neon's branching model is tailor-made for AI workflows — create a branch, let Claude run experiments, merge only what works. But the delete permission is one to think carefully about.
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When your AI agent's requests suddenly come from a different country, that's a red flag. Stow's Baseline Binding locks every agent to its first-trust network fingerprint — and blocks anything that deviates.
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Most AI proxies log your request payloads "for debugging purposes." Stow strips the content before it ever reaches the database. Here's exactly what that means — and what it doesn't.
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Not all AI requests are equal. Sending an email is different from deleting one. Stow generates a risk fingerprint for every action before allowing it to proceed.
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"AI has access to Gmail" is not a security policy. "AI can read messages and create drafts, but not send or delete" is. Here's how Stow's Policy Engine enforces the difference.
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You can't manage what you can't see. Stow's Activity Log gives you complete visibility into every AI action — without ever storing the content of those actions.
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In a platform where multiple users' AI agents run simultaneously, the most important security guarantee is that one user's agent can never touch another's data. Stow enforces this at the database level.
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Your AI agent acts while you're offline. Security alerts mean you're notified the moment something unusual happens — not when you remember to check the dashboard.
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When Claude makes a request through Stow, it doesn't talk directly to Gmail. It talks to a purpose-built MCP server that enforces a policy stack before a single byte hits the target API.
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Symmetric secrets are easy to implement and easy to leak. Stow's move to JWKS-based asymmetric verification via Supabase eliminates a class of credential exposure risk entirely.
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When Claude needs a Google OAuth token, should it ever hold that token? No. Stow mints and consumes tokens on behalf of your agent — they're used server-side and never exposed to the AI.
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Stow supports integrations across communication, productivity, developer tools, databases, deployment, and scheduling — with more in the pipeline. Here's what each one unlocks.
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The right Stow plan depends on how many services you're connecting and how many agents you're running. Here's how to think through it — and how to upgrade without downtime.
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Some actions are too important to let AI execute without a human in the loop. The Stow approval queue pauses these requests and hands control back to you — before anything happens.
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Moved offices? Switched ISPs? Your agent's requests may start getting blocked. Secret rotation resets the Security Baseline — here's when to do it and exactly how.
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Cursor writes the code, opens the PR, and triggers the deploy — all in one session. Three services, three permission surfaces, one place to control all of it.
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Cursor can write migration scripts and run them — on a Neon branch. The whole point is it never touches main until you say so. Here's the setup that makes that guarantee real.
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Your AI coding agent just fixed a bug and opened a PR. Should it also post to #engineering? Only if you've set it up intentionally — here's how to do it without handing Cursor the keys to every channel.
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Claude manages your email and communication. Cursor manages your codebase and dev tools. Both run through Stow — same policy layer, separate Security Baselines, zero overlap.
Report ID: 030
Lead emails in → structured Airtable record created → Notion brief drafted. Claude handles the whole intake flow across three services — here's the permission matrix that keeps it safe.
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Claude reads your GitHub activity from yesterday, drafts a standup update, logs it to Notion, and posts to your team Slack channel — with your approval before it posts.
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Deployment fails. Claude reads the Vercel logs, creates a GitHub issue with the error details, and notifies #engineering. All three steps happen in sequence — and only the Slack post needs your approval.
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Brief in Notion → status tracked in Airtable → first draft in Google Docs. AI handles the transitions between stages without touching anything it shouldn't.
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Prospect emails you → Claude reads it, creates an Airtable deal record, and drafts a Notion context page. You review and send the reply. The whole intake handled without touching a spreadsheet.
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New PR opened → Claude reads the diff and comments → summary posted to Slack → review notes saved to Notion. The AI reviewer that never forgets to log its work.
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Connecting Claude to Gmail, Slack, and GitHub is genuinely useful. It's also a new attack surface most people don't think about until something goes wrong. Here's what the risks actually are.
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Composio and Stow both let Claude and Cursor connect to your tools. The difference is what happens in between — and how much control you keep.
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The MCP gateway category didn't exist two years ago. Now there are a dozen options and the differences matter — especially if your AI agent is touching production data.
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A year ago, nobody used the term 'MCP gateway.' Now it's showing up in enterprise AI discussions and security audits. Here's what it actually means — and the simple test for whether you need one.
Report ID: 040
Claude Code and Cursor both support MCP, both run background agents, and both can connect to GitHub, Vercel, Slack, and more. The real difference is workflow philosophy.
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Windsurf's Cascade agent supports MCP natively — which means you can route every tool call through Stow's permission and audit layer, the same way Cursor does. Here's the exact setup.
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100% of tested AI coding agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks — and the most common payload is credential extraction. Here's the architecture that makes credential theft impossible.
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The EU AI Act's major enforcement deadline is August 2, 2026. If your team uses AI agents that touch production data, you have specific logging and human oversight requirements to meet.
Report ID: 044
AI agents sending emails sounds powerful—but it’s also risky if done wrong. Learn how to use AgentMail with Claude the right way.